In this paper we study rankings induced by power indices of players in simple game models of bicameral legislatures, the US legislative system, and similar legislative systems. We show that a member of the smaller house of a bicameral legislature has more power than a member of the larger house, in almost all cases. Using a standard model of the US legislative system as a simple game, we look at rankings of the four types of players -the president, the vice president, senators, and representatives. We show that regardless of the power index used, the president is always ranked above the other players, and a senator is always ranked above a representative and ranked the same as or above the vice president. For most power index rankings, including the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices, the vice president is ranked above a representative, however, there exist power indices ranking a representative above the vice president.
Introduction
A power index assigns a numerical measure of power to each voter in a simple game and thus yields a ranking of the voters. In this paper we look at power index rankings of the voters in simple game models of bicameral legislatures and similar legislative systems. More specifically, we study power index rankings in the standard simple game model of the US legislative system, which has four types of players: senators, representatives, the president, and the vice president. We show that in a bicameral legislature, the members of the smaller house have more power than the members of the larger house, regardless of the power index used, almost always. The exceptions correspond to legislatures where the size of the houses are very close together and the power index chosen is unrealistic in that it heavily weights a very narrow range of coalition sizes; such indices do not appear to measure power in a reasonable or meaningful way.
In the case of the US legislative system, we show that regardless of the power index chosen, the president always has more power than the other players, a senator always has more power than a representative, and a senator always has at least as much power as the vice president. For "reasonable" power indices, including the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices, the ranking from most power to least power is: president, senator, vice president, representative. These results apply to more general systems which are similar to the US legislative system, with a bicameral legislature plus a president or a bicameral legislature plus a president and vice president.
Power indices for this simple game model of the US legislative system have been studied previously, but in the context of calculating power with a specific index. For example, in the book by Taylor and Pacelli [7] , the authors discuss calculating Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power in a model of the US legislative system (without the vice president). Brams, Affuso, and Kilgour [2] study Banzhaf and Johnston power in the same model (no vice president). In both of these cases, the authors are interested in the percent of power held by the players rather than power index rankings.
Preliminaries

Simple Games and Power Indices
A (monotonic) simple game is a pair (N, W) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and W is a set of subsets of N , called the winning coalitions, such that
• N ∈ W.
• If S ∈ W and S ⊆ T , then T ∈ W.
The minimal winning coalitions are the winning coalitions for which no proper subset is winning. The set of winning coalitions is determined by the minimal ones since a subset S ∈ W if and only if S contains a minimal winning coalition.
A simple game is a model of a yes-no voting system in which the players are deciding on a single alternative such as a motion, bill, or amendment. The winning coalitions are precisely the sets of players that can force a bill to pass if they all support it.
Given a simple game (N, W) and S ∈ W containing player i, we say i is critical in S if S is winning and S \ {i} is losing. For i ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ n, let
Let c i (k) = |C i (k)|, the number of coalitions of size k in which i is critical. Definition 1. Define a binary relation on N by i j iff c i (k) ≥ c j (k) for all k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and write i ≻ j if c i (k) > c j (k) for all k such that c i (k) and c j (k) are not both zero. Following [3] , we call the weak desirability relation.
Power Indices
Power indices are a way to measure the relative power of the players in a simple game. The most famous of these are the Shapley-Shubik index [6] and the Banzhaf index [1] . Semivalues were introduced in 1979 by Weber [8] as a generalization of the notion of a power index to general cooperative games. Dubey et al. [4] show that semivalues can be characterized in terms of a weighting vector (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ) such that λ k ≥ 0 for all k and
Given a semivalue Φ with weighting vector (λ 1 , . . . , λ n ), the Φ-power of a player i is defined by
Thus the λ i 's give a weighting of a player's contribution to coalitions of size k. Let p(Φ) = n i=1 Φ(i), the total power in the game, then the power index determined by Φ is
so that p Φ i is the fraction of the Φ-power held by player i. The Shapley-Shubik power index is defined by weighting coefficients λ k = 1/n n−1 k−1 and the Banzhaf power index is defined by weighting coefficients λ k = 1/2 n−1 .
Any semivalue Φ defines a ranking on the set of players in a simple game and we write i ≥ Φ j to denote that Φ(i) ≥ Φ(j) and i > Φ j if Φ(i) > Φ(j). Clearly, different semivalues can lead to different rankings for the same game. In [5] , Saari and Sieberg look at rankings of players coming from semivalues in cooperative games. They show that different indices can generate radically different rankings and that there can be many different rankings even for games with a relatively small number of players. This is in contrast to our results which show that there are only two possible rankings for a simple game model of the US legislative system. 
Binomial Coefficients
For the simple games we study in this work, formulas for the numbers c i (k) involve binomial coefficients. In this section we give some results on binomial coefficients that will enable us to compare these numbers for various players. We denote the natural numbers 1, 2, 3, . . . by N. Recall that for n, k ∈ N with 0 ≤ k ≤ n, the binomial coefficient n k denotes that number of ways of choosing k elements from a set of n elements. Here are some basic facts about binomial coefficients:
Suppose we have a simple game with two types of players, say that there are n players of type 1 and m players of type 2. Let i be a specific player of type 1 and suppose we want to count the number of coalitions that contain i and have exactly a players of type 1 and b players of type 2. Creating such a coalition consists of choosing a − 1 players from the n − 1 players of type 1 that are not i and choosing b players from the m players of type 2. Thus there are n−1 a−1 · m b such coalitions. Formulas for the numbers c i (k) we need always involve products of two binomial coefficients. The following result will allow us to compare these numbers.
Then for all i ∈ N with 0 ≤ i < n − a,
Proof. (a): For positive integers u < p and an integer i such that 0
We will prove (1) by induction on i.
u−1 = p/u, thus to prove (1) for in this case we must show that m/b > n/a, equivalently, a/b > n/m. Since m > n, we have nm + m > nm + n and thus (n + 1)/(m + 1) > n/m. Hence, by assumption (iii),
This proves the base case i = 0.
Suppose 0 ≤ i ≤ n and f (m, b, i) > f (n, a, i). Using basic properties of binomial coefficients, we have
Cross-multiplying, we see that (2) 
Then, using the inequality in (a), we have
Bicameral Voting Systems
We look at power in a bicameral legislative system where bills are passed with a simple majority in each house. We will show that a member of the smaller house always has more power than a member of the larger house regardless of the choice of semivalue used to measure power, in almost all cases. The exceptional case is when the smaller house has an odd number of members, the larger house has an even number of members, and the houses are very close in size. In this case, although for most coalition sizes a member of the smaller house has more critical instances, there are a few coalition sizes for which the reverse is true. Semivalues for which the weights outside of this narrow range are vanishingly small will give more power to members of the larger house; however, semivalues of this type do not seem like a reasonable way to measure power.
Consider a simple game with two types of players, senators and representatives, and assume that there is an odd number of both and that there are more representatives than senators. Then there are positive integers p < q such that there are 2p + 1 senators and 2q + 1 representatives. Assuming bills are passed with a majority in each house, the minimal winning coalitions consist of p + 1 senators plus q + 1 representatives. It follows that a senator is critical in a coalition iff the coalition consists of the senator plus p other senators and q + 1 or more representatives; a representative is critical in a coalition iff the coalition consists of the representative plus q other representatives and p + 1 or more senators. This implies that if voter i is a representative, then c i (k) = 0 for p + q + 2 ≤ k ≤ 2p + q + 2 and if i is a senator, then c i (k) = 0 for p + q + 2 ≤ k ≤ p + 2q + 2.
Proposition 2. Let s be a senator and r a representative in the simple game described above.
Proof. From the above we see that the coalitions in which s is critical have size between p + q + 2 and p + 2q + 2 and the coalitions in which r is critical have size between p+q+2 and 2p+q+2. Thus c s (k) > c r (k) = 0 for 2p+q+3 ≤ k ≤ p+2q+2.
Thus c s (k) > c r (k) by Lemma 1(a) with n = 2p + 1, m = 2q + 1, a = p + 1, and b = q + 1. Assumption (iii) is (p + 1)/(q + 1) ≥ (2p + 2)/(2q + 2), which is clearly true.
Corollary 1. For s and r as above, s ≻ r. Hence for any semivalue Φ, s > Φ r.
Remark. The same result holds in a bicameral system in which both houses have an even number of players, bills are passed by a simple majority, and one house is smaller than another. If the houses have size 2p and 2q with p < q, then the proof is the same using Lemma 1 with n = 2p, m = 2q, a = p + 1 and b = q + 1. However, if the house sizes are 2p + 1 and 2q, with p < q and the difference between p and q is small, then we will have c s (k) < c r (k) for k close to the minimum. 
The US Legislative System
We model the US legislative system as a simple game with 537 players: the president, vice president, 100 senators in the Senate, and 435 representatives in the House of Representatives. A bill passes if a majority of the senators and representatives vote yes and the president signs the bill. If the president does not sign the bill, it can be passed with a supermajority of at least 67 senators and 290 representatives. The role of the vice president is to break ties in the Senate. For winning coalitions in which the president is critical, the vice president plays the same role as a senator; in these cases we can assume that the senate contains 101 players. We will call the set of senators plus the vice president the "full Senate".
There are two types of minimal winning coalitions:
I. 51 from the full Senate, 218 representatives, and the president;
II. 67 senators and 290 representatives.
We look at critical instances for the four types of players in order to compare the numbers c i (k). Note that if a winning coalition contains exactly 51 senators, then every senator is critical and adding the vice president yields a coalition in which no senator is critical. Apart from this case, if a player who is not the vice president is critical in a coalition that does not contain the vice president, then this player is still critical if the vice president is added to the coalition.
For ease of exposition, fix a senator s and a representative r and let p denote the president and v the vice president. The following table lists the different types of coalitions, along with their sizes, in which the president (P1 -P4), the senator s (S1 -S3), the representative r (R1 -R3), or the vice president (V) are critical, along with the possible sizes. 
Proof. Fix k such that c p (k) = 0, then 270 ≤ k ≤ 503. Recall that C i (k) denotes the set of coalitions of size k in which i is critical.
(a): Every coalition in which v is critical contains p, and p is also critical, thus c p (k) ≥ c s (k). In addition, given S ∈ C v (k), the coalition formed by removing v and adding a senator not already in S is in C p (k) and not in
, then p is critcal in S and we define f (S) = S. If S is type S2 or S3, then the coalition S ′ = (S \ {s}) ∪ {p} is in C p (k) since it contains only 66 senators, and we define f (S) = S ′ . Then f is clearly injective, hence c p (k) ≥ c s (k). To show that the inequality is strict we need only show that f is not surjective.
If 270 ≤ k ≤ 356, then there are no type S2 or S3 coalitions in C s (k). Thus any coalition in C p (k) that does not contain s is not in Im f , and there are clearly many of these. Now suppose 357 ≤ k ≤ 502 and letS be a coalition in Im f of the form (S \ {s}) ∪ {p} with S ∈ C s (k) of type S2 or S3. ThenS has exactly 66 senators and 434 or less representatives and we can construct a new coalition in C p (k) by replacing any senator inS by a representative not already inS. This clearly yields a coalition in C p (k) that is not in Im f . Hence f is not injective in this case. 
Proof. Fix k and let j = k − 52. Coalitions in C v (k) consist of v plus 50 senators, j representatives, and the president, hence for 270 ≤ k ≤ 487,
(i) Since k ≤ 356, coalitions in C s (k) are type S1 only, thus they consist of s plus 50 others from the full Senate, j representatives, and p. Hence
(ii) For 488 ≤ k ≤ 503, c s (k) > 0 and c v (k) = 0, so this is clear. For 357 ≤ k ≤ 487, we note that in addition to the coalitions in C s (k) of type S1 above, there are coalitions of type S2 or S3 and v is never critical in these, hence c k (s) > c v (k). Finally, we compare the numbers c v (k) and c r (k). Apart from a narrow range of k's, c v (k) is the larger of the two. For r we must add up the contributions from the three types of critical instances. For type R1, c r (k) =
